Seventeenth Distinction. Second Part. On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question One. Whether the whole of pre-existing Charity is corrupted so that no Reality the same in Number remains in a greater and a lesser Charity

195. About increase in charity, on the supposition that charity could be increased - according to what Augustine says in his letter to Boniface [Epist. adPaulinum ch.3 n.10], and it is found in Lombard II d.26 ch.2 n.231, “charity merits increase so that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected,” and according to what he says On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater”Interpolation: “in the case of things that are not great in mass, to be greater is to be better.” ³³ (for some charity is better than another because a greater essential reward corresponds to it, therefore some charity is greater than another) - I ask about the manner of increase in charity, and first whether the whole of pre-existing charity is corrupted so that no reality that is the same in number remains in a greater and a lesser charity.

196. And that it does I argue:

Because otherwise the form itself would increase in the subject, because while remaining the same it would be transmuted from imperfection to perfection; but form is unchanging, according to the author of Six Principles ch.1 n.1; therefore charity cannot be increased in this way.Interpolation, replacing ‘because...increased’: “Because if it were not corrupted, then the form of charity would be changed from lesser to greater; this is false, because a simple form cannot be the subject of a transmutation.” ³⁴

197. On the contrary:

De Generatione et Corruptione 1.5.321b10-13, “the thing increased has to

35 remain”; therefore in any increase there is no corruption of what pre-existed.Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...pre-existed’: “therefore pre-existing charity, when increased by a new degree of subsequent charity, should remain and not be corrupted.” ³⁵

I. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

A. Exposition of the Opinion

198. Here it is said that nothing of preexistent charity remains the same in number in increased charity, but the whole of what existed before is corrupted and another individual more perfect than it is generated.

199. The reason set downInterpolation, in place of ‘nothing...reason’: “in every intensification of any form whatever, the degree of the preceding form is corrupted upon the advent of the other, subsequent form.” ³⁶ for this is that the terms of motion are incompossible (Physics 5.3.227a7-10), therefore the terms of this motion or change - whereby charity is increased - will be incompossible terms; therefore that which is the term ‘to which’ is simply incompossible with the term ‘from which’; therefore it does not include anything the same in number.Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...number’: “the degree that precedes and that which arrives de novo are, in the case of this change of increase in the form, terms of the change, therefore they are not together at the same time; therefore one is corrupted when the other arrives.” ³⁷

200. A confirmation for this reason is that just as, in the case of species, the positing of the more and less is on account of the essential ordering of species, so it seems it should in its own way be in the case of individuals of the same species; but a more perfect species (which is called a greater species) is simply a different nature from a more imperfect species, such that nothing the same in number - that is, of the inferior nature - remains in the superior, and the superior is in itself simpler than the inferior, because in the case of forms the superior is more perfect and more actual and simpler (the fact is plain in the forms of separate substances, and hence God is most simple); therefore in the case of individuals of the same species nothing of the more imperfect remains the same in number in the more perfect, because then ‘the more perfect’ would be more composite than the more imperfect.Interpolation, in place of n.200: “For this opinion [n.198] I add two reasons. The first is this: the more and less in the same species are related in the same way that the more and less in diverse species are proportionally related; but in diverse species the more that one species is more perfect than another the more perfectly it contains it and in a simpler way, such that the species contained by it does not make any addition to it; therefore since simplicity is perfection in all forms, it seems too that in the same species the simpler form is more perfect, not possessing a preceding degree or form added to it.” ³⁸

201. A second confirmation is that it seems likewise that in a substance the more and less (if they exist there) should be posited in the same species, and also in an accident in the same species, especially in the case of an accident where there is no change in accord with it; but substance, because of its lack of change, the ‘more’ posited there is altogether another individual, not possessing in itself the ‘less’ as some part of itself but being as simple as or more simple than that ‘less’; therefore the like will be posited in the case of charity, which no change accords with - the point is plain.Interpolation, in place of n.201: “Again, more and less in accidental forms are related in a way similar to that in which they are related in substantial forms, if there be more and less in substances; but according to everyone who posits a more and less in substantial form, the more perfect substance, even in the same species, is simpler than another one, not by making addition to the less perfect but by containing it in a simple way - as is posited about the soul of Christ, which was not more composite than the soul of Peter but simpler, and yet was more perfect in essence of soul; therefore it is the same way with accidental form.” ³⁹

B. Rejection of the Opinion

202. Against this position [n.198] there is argument in six ways, one of which is taken from the presupposition of form in the case of increase in that form - and in accord with this way I argue first as follows:

[First way] - Although it is not necessary that God increase charity in the instant in which a meritorious act is elicited (by which ‘charity merits to be increased’ [n.195]), yet he can then increase it, such that the increase which someone merits is given at the same point in time as the act is elicited.

203. From this I argue: this act, which merits increase of charity, is meritorious, -therefore it presupposes charity in the instant in which it is elicited. I ask which charity? Not the new part which is acquired, because this follows the act as the reward the merit; therefore it presupposes the charity that was pre-existent, and consequently it is not corrupted in that instant, - because if so, then in that instant a meritorious act could not be elicited, in which instant however someone merits increase of charity.Interpolation, in place of nn.202-203: “Against this opinion [n.198] the argument goes as follows: the supposition is made that it is possible that God can increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, - so let it be posited in fact that he is then increasing charity. I ask then by which charity the meritorious act is elicited (because it is necessarily elicited by some charity, as was shown before [Reportatio IA d.17 n.27]); not by the newly infused charity which was increasing charity in the instant in which that charity was supporting the act, because the newly infused charity is the reward of such an act and follows that meritorious act in some order; nor is it elicited by the preceding charity, because according to you [Godfrey] it is corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is corrupted; therefore in the instant in which charity is increased there is a meritorious act and yet it is not from any charity, which is impossible.” ⁴⁰

204. But if someone impudently says that God never increases charity in the instant of time in which the act is had that is meritorious in respect of the increase but always later in duration, on the ground that God increases charity, not because of the act insofar as it is elicited, but insofar as it is in divine acceptance, and that in this way the charity remains after the instant in which the act is elicited, and that then after that instant the increase is conferred:

205. Although this response is altogether improbable if it deny that God can increase charity then [sc. in the same instant that the act is elicited] (because if he can, let his doing so be posited in fact, and the argument proceeds), nevertheless it does not in other respects escape difficulty.

First indeed because in moral and intellectual virtues virtue is increased by the elicited act, and not when the act is not, because when it is not it causes nothing; therefore then, when the act is present, is there reason for increasing the habit. Therefore if then a new individual is generated and the one that was before is corrupted, it follows that the act that is augmentative of the habit is not elicited by the habit but by the power alone, which seems discordant, because then - in accord with what was said in the preceding question [nn.69-70] - the act that is augmentative of the habit would be more imperfect than another act, elicited by the habit, that is non-augmentative of the habit.Interpolation, in place of nn.204-205: “You will say that God does not increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, but the act of charity passes by and stands in divine acceptance as something rewardable, and then God - accepting the meritorious act - afterward gives increase to the pre-existing charity as a sort of reward for the act, and he does not at once in the same instant give the reward along with the merit, just as he did not give beatitude to the good angels in the first instant in which they merited it but in some later instant of nature. - On the contrary: although this could be said in the proposed case about the infused virtues, yet it could not be said about the increase of the natural virtues, moral and intellectual, and especially the moral; for moral virtue is increased by moral acts, just as it is generated from them (Ethics 2.1.1103b21-22); therefore the act which augments and increases moral virtue is only increasing it when it exists. Therefore I ask whether, when it increases it, it does so from some virtue or not. If from some virtue, from which virtue? Not from the preceding one, because that is corrupted - nor from the degree that it brings about, because that is posterior as effect to its cause; therefore, when it increases virtue it does so not from any virtue; but this is impossible, because then it would not be virtuous and yet it would generate virtue, which is against the Philosopher and against all understanding, because “from like acts like habits are generated” [Ethics ibid.]. - One could argue in the same way about an intellectual act: when the act of speculating exists the intellectual or speculative habit is increased, because when the act does not exist it does nothing; but that act is not from the preceding habit, because then there is no such habit because it is corrupted (because in the instant in which it comes to be is the habit increased, not from the preceding degree [of the habit]); nor is it from the subsequent degree, because that is subsequent; therefore such an act cannot be said in any way to cause increase, because there is no term at which the increase comes to be.” ⁴¹

206. And if it also concede the conclusion that ‘the act augmentative of the acquired habit is elicited by the power alone’ (although this seems discordant), yet it does not escape the following special difficulty, if the intelligible species is posited as being increased by the act of understanding. For that act cannot be elicited by the power alone, the species having been removed, because - as was made plain in I d.3 nn.486-498 - the intellect is not sufficient without the species for eliciting an act of understanding; therefore no intellection that is elicited from the power alone can increase the species; the intellection, then, that is augmentative of the species presupposes the species, and not the individual one that is generated - so the preexisting individual, and consequently the preexisting one is not corrupted.

207. But if it be denied that intellection increases the intelligible species, the final instance - against the proposal - is as follows:

The will can, by its own act, weaken an act of understanding, - the proof is that it can totally corrupt and remove the intellect from this act; and yet the volition that weakens intellection necessarily presupposes intellection; not some new one that follows the volition itself, as is plain; therefore some intellection that precedes volition and consequently the preexisting intellection is not corrupted by it.Interpolation, in place of n.207: “Again, the will can weaken an act of understanding, because it can corrupt the act of it altogether by its own willing, by turning it away from consideration of any secondary object so that it does not determinately consider it. But every act of the will is naturally preceded by an act of the intellect. In that instant, then, in which the will weakens the act of the intellect by its own imperative act, the intellect must be in its own act; not in the preceding intense act, because that act does not remain intense when the will thus weakens it, as the position holds; nor in the weakened act, because that act naturally follows the act of the will; therefore if the weakened act is not some part of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in the instant in which the will is in its act with respect to any object, the intellect is not first naturally in act with respect to that object, and then the will is willing something unknown, - which is impossible.” ⁴²

208. [Second way] - The second way is from the perfection of that which is introduced by the increase.

Here the argument goes first as follows: in acts augmentative of a habit the tenth act can be more imperfect than the first, and yet by that tenth act the habit is increased to some degree to which it could not before be increased by the first or second act; this cannot be if the preexisting whole is corrupted, because the perfection of the first or second act was in itself greater than the perfection of the tenth act was in itself, and consequently the individual of whose generation the first act was capable could be more perfect than the individual of which the tenth act was capable; therefore the fact that what follows the tenth act is more perfect than what follows the first will not be because the new individual is generated by virtue of the tenth, but because something is added to the preexisting individual - generated by the preceding acts -, and thus the preexisting individual will remain.Interpolation, in place of n.208: “Secondly I argue in this way by supposing that the second or third act could intensify the habit even though it is not more perfect or more intense than the first act, -then I argue: if the later act intensifies the habit and yet is not necessarily more intense nor more perfect than any preceding act whatever, then it does not generate a more perfect individual habit of charity, which is contrary to you [sc. Godfrey]. The proof of the consequence is that an act generating a habit cannot generate it save according to the proportion of its own virtue; so if this act, which is more imperfect than the first act, generates an individual habit of charity, and a more perfect one, this will be either in virtue of the preceding acts, and then these acts remain and are not corrupted, as the opinion supposes [of Godfrey], - or by its own virtue, and then the effect will be more perfect than its whole cause in virtue, which is false.” ⁴³

209. But if it be said that the preceding acts elicited by charity remain in divine acceptance (although not in themselves, nor in anything impressed by them), then the argument about the acquisition of intellectual and moral habits [n.208] is not solved.Text cancelled by Scotus: “The reasoning about natural agents [n.208] is also not solved; for posit that to something with nine degrees of heat there comes something hot in a lesser degree, then the latter can in some way intensify the former thing with its nine degrees of heat, and consequently the hot thing that will exist in the term of the action will be more perfect in heat than the agent is that comes to it and increases it; this would be impossible if it were ‘a new individual’ generated by the act of the now present hot thing. The proof of the major is that, according to the Philosopher Physics 8.10.266a24-b6, “a greater extensive virtue exists in a greater magnitude,” - therefore if from the beginning the virtue in the greater magnitude is close to the thing acted on by it, it will act more; but this, as far as the action is concerned, is just the same as if it was one greater continuous magnitude, or was many magnitudes all together - contiguous with each other - equal to that one magnitude; therefore a less extensive magnitude, if it is from the beginning contiguous with a greater extensive hot thing, has power for introducing a more perfect form, - therefore, if from the beginning a large hot thing acts of itself, it will not introduce as great a form as would be introduced if some small hot thing were contiguous with it; therefore the thing acted on is left potential with respect to a degree [sc. of heat] that can be introduced by that lesser hot thing if it becomes contiguous, - therefore the lesser thing, when it arrives, will reduce it to act. Response: let everything be conceded up to the final consequence; but let that consequence be denied, because a lesser thing, when it arrives, does not find the thing that is acted on to be in a contrary disposition which it could conquer but it is conquered by that disposition - therefore it will be simply acted on, and if it does any little thing to the contrary, this will be by being more intensely weakened, but eventually it will be conquered. Nor can this be evaded by an order of degrees, to wit, that the agent can reduce the thing acted on, which was before in a different degree, to a more perfect degree than it could have reduced it to at the beginning, just as an agent can make a thing acted on, which is already organized, to be alive, and yet it cannot reduce a non-organized thing to as great a perfection as the prior one did (and this because of the order of forms in becoming, or of degrees in form, on account of which order the thing existing in a more imperfect degree can be at once reduced to a degree more perfect, - not so if it were not in that degree); this response - I say - is not valid, because if a thing hot in eight degrees intensifies a thing hot in nine degrees and this intensification is done by the heat of a weaker agent and by the generation of a new individual, then in the instant in which a thing hot in ten degrees is generated, the thing generated will exceed in perfection the heat of the generator - which is impossible; therefore increase does not happen in this way.” This interpolation is followed by the following note of Duns Scotus: “The two reasons are against Godfrey, one that in alteration there is no continuous change (because what subject would it have?), the other that a changeable thing will be hot with many heats, because the part in a motion more remote from the mover is not as intense in form as a part close to the mover. [**] But what is set down here above under [the above interpolation] is not certain, because what is there supposed, namely that ‘the weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies more intensely, even as to any degree at all’, is rather the other way round, and then ‘the thing that is acted on is contrary, insofar as what arrives is imperfect and is not able to conquer what is more perfect but is conquered by it, -therefore it does not act, or if it reacts in any respect, it will be more intensely weak in making it like itself’; this does not seem to be an instance, save in the case of light; perhaps there something less virtuous than the first agent intensifies the effect of it, and yet it would not be capable in itself save of what is weaker in the form which it finds in the thing it acts on. What is the cause there if the hot thing does not so act?” ⁴⁴

210. If no agent can intensify the form, which it finds in what it acts on, to make it more perfect than the form which it could of itself cause in what it acts on, this whole second reasoning fails, because then an act never intensifies a habit save to that degree which it could of itself induce, and then it would not be apparent why it could not induce it if it was a new individual such that nothing of what preexisted would remain. But because it is manifest that a tenth act, as equally intense as the first, intensifies the habit beyond the degree induced by the first or second act, therefore the first proposition [sc. at the beginning here, n.210] seems in need of being denied.

211. But then there is a doubt whether this is so in the case of heat, namely that a weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies the more intense heat that is found in what it acts on (it seems it does not, as here below in the line marked **A reference to the passage marked [**] in the note to n.209. ⁴⁵). One can say that a univocal agent does not intensify its own more intense form that is found in what it acts on, but rather the reverse; but an equivocal agent does intensify it, because it is of a nature to act on this and not to be acted on by it, and its own form is more noble than any degree of an equivocal effect that it finds, although it not have at once of itself power for so great a degree of equivocal effect. Therefore light is intensified infinitely if infinite lights of the same species are put around a medium, each one of which would intensify the light in that medium.

212. [Third way] - The third way is taken from natural things and the action of contrary on contrary.

For a hot thing acting on a cold thing weakens the cold thing before it corrupts it completely. If in this weakening of the cold thing a new individual cold thing is generated, I ask by what is it generated? If recourse is not had to a universal agent (which recourse is here irrational), no particular generator for this individual can be assigned, because the hot that is weakening the cold thing cannot of itself generate an individual cold thing; therefore neither is the weakened cold thing a new individual.Interpolation, in place of 212: “Third as follows: a hot thing corrupting a cold thing first weakens the cold thing; for two movements go together, intensification and increase in heat and weakening in coldness (namely the motion of intensifying heat and weakening coldness); therefore according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] a new individual cold thing is generated. I ask then for the term ‘from which’ of this motion towards coldness; it cannot be said that the greater coldness is what precedes, because this coldness is corrupted; nor is the weaker degree of cold that which follows, because then the effect would surpass its cause in entity and perfection, which is not intelligible, according to Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12 ch.16 n.33 and 83 Questions q.2. - Again, everything which moves is, while it moves, partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’ (Physics 6.1.231b28-232a6). If therefore the hot thing acts on the cold thing, then in the whole motion the cold thing possesses something of the term ‘to which’ (namely something of hot); if then in the whole motion the cold thing is not weakened before it is corrupted, the consequence is that the extreme contrary, and not a weakened contrary, exists along with some degree of its contrary, and consequently, since these forms of contrariety do not have any latitude in being contrary, extreme contraries could at the same time be true. The cold thing then is weakened. Therefore, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] some supposit for cold is generated; but it is not generated from the preceding cold, because that has been corrupted; therefore it is generated from the hot, and thus the hot would generate the cold, which is impossible. - Again, fourth as follows: if the preceding form is always corrupted, the consequence is that there cannot be motion according to degree in the form of quality, because as soon as there is a departure from the term ‘from which’, another form is generated; therefore there will only be motion in quality according to the degree of the movable thing. But this is false, because then there would be a continuous motion whose parts were yet not joined to any common term, because the changing that joins them - I ask what is it in? Either it is in something divisible or in something indivisible; not in a part that is divisible, because no part is changed as a whole but part before part, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey]; therefore the motion would take place in an indivisible part, and so a point would become hot. - Again, it also follows that every heatable, while it is being heated, is heated with infinite heats; because if motion takes place precisely successively in accord with the degrees of the movable thing, since there are infinite parts in a movable thing (as in a heatable thing), at least potentially, and no part of the movable is made hot with the same degree of heat as another part, but with another heat and in another degree, - the result is that the whole will be made hot by infinite degrees of heat, which is impossible.” ⁴⁶

213. [Fourth way] - The fourth way is taken from the fact that the Philosopher allows for motion in the case of accidents in the same manner in which he denies it for substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11], and consequently the more and less, as they are required in accidents, so they are not required in substances; but if there were no increase in accidents save by corruption of what preexists and by generation of what is new - and this is how more and less can be found in substances - then the more or less would exist no more in accidents than in substances.

214. [Fifth way] - Fifth, an argument is drawn from the fact that a nature which admits of more and less in determinate degree will be a species in relation to individuals, and an inferior species to boot contained under a species of nature, and thus no species of a nature capable of being intensified of weakened - as we posit these species now - will be a most specific species.Tr. Whiteness and blackness etc. are now posited to be most specific species in the genus of color, but if each of these has inferior species beneath it (sc. because each degree of whiteness or blackness is a sub-species under the species of white and black), then whiteness and blackness will be the genera of these inferior species and not most specific species themselves after all. ⁴⁷

The proof of the first consequence is that anything that is said of individuals per se and in their ‘whatness’ and is ‘per se one thing’ is the species of them; nature in a determinate degree - in such and such a degree - is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘per se one thing’, because the nature in this degree belongs essentially to the things that have nature in this degree, and the degree does not add to the nature something accidental to it; so it is plain that the nature in such a degree is a species, and plain that it is less common than the species of the nature in itself; therefore it would be a species inferior in order to the species of the nature.Note by Duns Scotus: “The fifth argument needs to be solved in the case of substances, against which it draws its conclusion. The minor then is false [sc. nature in a determinate degree - in such and such a degree - is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘per se one thing’], because of the part that reads ‘in their whatness’, because the ‘what’ abstracts from all individual conditions, from ‘more’ just as much as from ‘thisness’ (Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11). ‘More’ is an individual condition, not a determinate one as is ‘this’, but an indeterminate one, because there can be the same degree though not the same ‘this’; but not conversely; for there cannot be this individual without this degree. - On the contrary: in that case the degree is being understood to determine the nature rather than to determine the ‘this’, and to be doing so per se and at that prior stage; otherwise it is an accident and a common difference; therefore etc. Response: common, but not universal, because individual. - On the contrary: at least it is a per se predicable, a mean between the most specific species and the individual; likewise, some species is posited as being distinguished by degrees of the form, as animals by degrees of sensitive form and angels by degrees of intellective form. Response: a species states the ‘what’, a species in a certain degree states the ‘what of the how much in virtue’; ‘how much’ is not a [specific] difference [I d.8 n.108].” ⁴⁸

215. [Sixth way] - Sixth and last there is the argument that if the reason adduced for the position [nn.198-199] is valid, it should work in the same way about the how much of bulk as about the how much of virtue, and so when a bulk is increased in amount nothing of it would remain the same; therefore in the case of increase in bulk properly speaking the preexisting quantity would not remain in the increased thing, which seems discordant.a

a [Interpolation] Further, the reasoning [n.199] is not valid, because then it would work universally about any increase, and so in bodily increase the term that precedes and the degree that increases would be incompossibles, which is to destroy increase.

216. Response in accord with this position is made by conceding the conclusion -that there is a new individual in the how much of bulk when something is bigger just as, when something is ‘more intensified’, there is a different individual of that intensifiable form.

217. But against this there seem to be two discordant results that follow.

The first is that if the species of wine are diluted in the Eucharist,Tr. In preparing the wine for consecration a small amount of water is added to it, and this small amount of water must, to that small extent, dilute the wine. ⁴⁹ there will be a greater quantity in bulk than there was before, because greater quantity follows on dilution; if then the quantity of wine which existed before does not remain after dilution, then the blood does not remain there, because it is commonly held that the wine does not remain there except to the extent that the accidents remain that are the affections of the converted wine.

218. The other discordance is that then it would seem that such dilution could not be by virtue of a natural agent, or that the natural agent would act without any matter or substance presupposed; for it is plain that substantial matter is not there presupposed, for there is not there an alterable substance, nor is it even presupposed that a quantity the same in number remains (for you), and yet the natural agent is able - as it seems - thus to dilute or condense those species; therefore the natural agent is able to act without presupposing anything in its action, and thus to create.

219. Response to these discordances:

To the first, that as long as accidents remain similar to affections of the wine the blood remains; and although they do not remain the same, they do nevertheless remain similar after dilution.

220. To the other the concession is made that the natural agent can act when nothing common remains under the terms; yet it does not create, because this later thing follows - in order of nature - that former thing; creation is not like this.

221. Argument is made against these responses:

Because although this numerically new quantity differs from the preexisting quantity, and a quantity of water does not differ from a quantity of wine in any other way save in number alone (because it plainly does not differ in species), the result is that because of the permanence of the accidents, the same in species, not in number, the blood does not remain under the new quantity more than it would remain under the quantity of water, if water was what was chiefly there, since this new quantity is not inclined to affect the wine - whose quantity it was before - more than to affect the water.

222. Against the other response [n.220] there seems to be discordance in an active natural virtue presupposing a subject in its action.

223. Further, I ask how one of these follows on the other? Either without the action of the agent - and this is manifestly discordant, because then the natural agent would act in vain, because without it the consequent would still follow. Therefore the consequent does not follow save by the action of the natural agent. But such an agent cannot make the effect to exist unless the material cause is presupposed; otherwise creation, or the sort of action that is repugnant to a natural agent, would not - by such consequence - be prevented.

224. Further, according to this opinion [n.220] a natural agent could be said to be the effective cause of introducing the intellective soul, because the intellective soul follows by natural order on the organization of the body; the consequence here is commonly held to be discordant.a

a [Interpolation] They reply - see elsewhere, and for the arguments contrary to it, namely in IV d.12 p.2 a.1 q.1 n.6-7, 14-17.

II. To the Question

225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215] and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249].a

a [Interpolation, in place of n.225] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [Followed by this second interpolation] Nor is it corrupted per se, save as to the existence that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example comes from matter per se or form per se, which are not corrupted as they exist in the whole but remain in the whole more perfectly than when they had existence per se; the thing is plain in the case of a how much of bulk when it is increased. - As to the reason for this opinion [nn.198-199] I say that the terms of motion per se, of which sort are privation and form, are incompossibles; but a weakened form and an increased form are not per se these sorts of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positive state. Weakened and intense forms are terms of motion not per se but per accidens, namely to the extent that a weakened form is conjoined to a per se term that is a privation; hence although the per se term ‘from which’ of motion is, as a privation, corrupted when the term ‘to which’ is reached, yet the form that per accidens accompanies such a term ‘from which’ need not be per se corrupted. A fallacy of the consequent is therefore committed, because the weakened form is a term ‘from which’ as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being per se, and this does not remain; but as it exists in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term ‘to which’, and thus it remains the same in number as before, but more intense and more perfect. - To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and so one species does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can exist at the same time, and the form is so much the more intense and more perfect the more it exists under such several degrees of form. It exists in opposite ways, then, in this case and in that. - To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less by way of the parts of bulk (rather he in this way concedes their existence there), therefore he denies in the accidents the more and less in this way, namely by way of parts of bulk; now he denies in substances the more and less by way of degrees of form, so he concedes them in this way in accidents. Hence, because he lays down that substantial form is in itself indivisible, therefore he does not posit one degree of form along with another; things are the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible by way of degrees, - therefore any degree is compatible with another degree and is perfected by it.

III. To the Arguments

226. To the argument on behalf of the opinion of Godfrey [n.199] my response is: the term ‘from which’ is per se a privation of the degree to be introduced.

227. But what is the positive term ‘from which’ that is necessarily required? I reply: an imperfect degree.

228. On the contrary: the imperfect degree remains in the term ‘to which’ [n.225]. - I reply: it does not remain in a distinct act, the way the term ‘from which’ was, but it remains in the whole potentially, the way a part does.

229. On the contrary: it remains the same in every absolute sense; a respect is not the idea of a term ‘from which’ or ‘to which’. There seems to be the same difficultly about water when divided and united, namely what the term is ‘from which’ and ‘to which’; for if all the water is the term ‘from which’ of the division, and if ‘this separated part and that separated part’ are the term ‘to which’, each term was before the same in number in respect of anything absolute; some other force is here involved, because the two divided waters are separately counted, - therefore when the same numerical unity of each remains, they are always separately counted; but the same numerical unity of each remains in the whole, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing. Whoever would say that the parts in an absolute whole have the absolute existence of the whole, with respect to which the proper being of the parts is material (Metaphysics 5.2.1013b19-21), could say that the prior degree remains in the whole according to some absolute existence which was not there before; likewise about the water united to another water.

230. But the question still remains what the term ‘from which’ is that is incompossible with anything absolute? - No answer is assigned, so I briefly reply:

Per se the term ‘from which’ is incompossible with the term ‘to which’, - it is its privation; but the positive term ‘from which’ is not incompossible with the term ‘to which’ save by being put in the combination ‘the per se term from which’:The sign ‘(—)’ was put here for this clause by Scotus. ⁵⁰ unless one asserts the incompossibility, that ‘this is not this’ - or that ‘the same thing is not perfected at the same time by this and this’ as they are acts in distinct act. In this way indeed the prior degree is in two ways incompossible with the term ‘to which’: because it is never it, even when it is in it, and also because it is never the distinct act of that of which the term ‘to which’ is the distinct act.

231. But of these two ways of ‘unless one asserts’ etc. [n.230] the first is not sufficient for terms of motion, because whiteness is not sweetness [sc. and these are not terms of one and the same motion]; the second cannot posit the opposition of the term ‘from which’ on account of anything absolute in it, because being a distinct act adds to the absolute degree - in the way this degree remains - nothing but an exclusion, the exclusion of ‘being in another’ (the way a part is in the whole), and so to posit a term in this way is to posit it formally under the denial of a relation: therefore hold to the first remark, at ‘(—)’ [n.230 and footnote].

232. To the other point, about the divided water [n.229], I reply: just as a part in a whole does indeed exist, and in the act which terminates its generation (because division is not generation), yet it does not exist in a distinct act, which is an act along with exclusion of being a part; so there corresponds to it the unity that accords with the first idea of act [sc. the act that terminates its generation], and this unity remains with it in division and in union, - but according to the idea of distinct act [sc. act along with exclusion of being a part] there properly corresponds the unity that is the principle of number.

233. To the form. The first consequence [n.229] holds, speaking of unity in the second way [sc. unity as principle of number], because number is of discrete things; all the parts of a continuous thing are one in number, speaking of number strictly. - Further, the minor [sc. ‘there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing’] is false of numerical unity in the second way; it is true of it in the first way. Yet it does not follow that the same thing has two numerical unities; rather the same thing has, according to its absolute being, a unique and perpetual unity while it remains; but according to its exclusive being there corresponds to it a unity that is separately counted. And just as exclusive being is accidental to it, so its having a separately countable unity is accidental to it; for when its being is exclusive, its proper unity is separately countable, - when its being is not exclusive but it exists in another precisely as some part of it, then its proper unity is not separately counted but is a part of some separately counted unity, such that, in brief, ‘to be a separately countable unity’ properly requires exclusive being, because number is of discrete things.

234. To the argument for the opposite [n.196] I say that this consequence does not hold ‘the same form remains in the imperfect and perfect individual, therefore it is changed in subject’, because it does not remain as a subject of change but it remains as a nature in individual things, to which nature any individual whatever adds something. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is because that which is the subject of one individual of the nature is also the subject of another individual of it, and because the subject is possible and changeable from individual to individual; but the form itself, just as it is not the subject of one individual, so it is not the subject of another individual, and consequently it is not changeable from one to the other.

a [Interpolation] To the principal reason [see interpolation to n.196] I say that the form is not the subject of the change but is related to diverse degrees of it as a species to two individuals that possess the being of the species de novo; and the form is not the subject of them because, when individuals are multiplied de novo, the species begins now to be in one individual and now to be in another; hence there is no change of form according to those degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature of the form but they are intrinsic modes, asserting a certain degree of virtual quantity of that form.

Question Two. Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity

235. Secondly I aska whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity, such that if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have in itself essentially no positive reality other than that which preexisted in the mild charity.

And that the reality of the preexisting charity is in this way the whole essence and reality of the increased charity I prove thus:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: “forms are like numbers,” - in this respect, that ‘just as any number, when added, changes the number, so any degree in form, when added, changes the species’; therefore nothing can be added to the essence of this sort of form while the species remains the same. But the supposition is being made that the intense form is of the same species as the mild one, and so no degree over and above the reality of the form is there added.

a [Interpolation] The supposition that a prior charity is not corrupted when charity is increased raises a question, because of the other opinion about increase of charity [Rep IA d.17 n.103].

236. Further, in Metaphysics 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that “formal differences change the species:” a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.

237. Further, Porphyry says [The Predicables 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: “The existence,” he says, “of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease.”

238. Further, the author of the Six Principles [ch.1 n.1] says: “Form consists of a simple and invariable essence.”

239. Further, if any reality is added to a preexisting charity,a then charity when increased will not be in the species, because it will include something that is accidental to the specific nature; or if it is per se in the species,b it does not include anything other than what belongs to the nature of the species - and soc the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in the species.

a [Interpolation] [if any reality] exists in a charity which arrives de novo, different from what was in the preexisting charity ...

b [Interpolation ] it has whatever is required for the nature of a species, and consequently ...

c [Interpolation] since it has one degree beyond the lesser charity, a degree pertaining per se and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that...

240. On the contrary:

In that case [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity were the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235] the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater,” the charity of any of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.a

a [Interpolation] [as equally blessed] as Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of the charity, which is impossible.

I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] - An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject’s existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees.a But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. - But this inability to coexist, or incompossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the incompossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the incompossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are incompossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, - not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their incompossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.

a [Interpolation] that is, hot and cold when extreme but not when in milder degree (the thing is plain, because when the hot or the movement of the hot or of heat are made mild, the movement of cold is made more intense, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.a

a [Interpolation] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]: again I make supposition that a real motion or change is impossible without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity the lesser charity is the term ‘from which’ and the greater charity is the term ‘to which’, and this is a real production; therefore it is, in accord with the second supposition, necessarily toward some real term: not to the reality that altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be produced twice, and the preceding reality was the term of a different production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.a

a [Interpolation] for it is because the form is such that what has it is said to be such in accord with it. Therefore if the form is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more or less in accord with it; for it is contradictory that a ‘form in itself’ be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible in accord with it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition - that is, same in idea of being one - to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form.a If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say becauseb humidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,c - against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition.d Further,e then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree -and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and sof there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptive subject agreeing with each disposition.

a [Interpolation] Again, against their mode [sc. Godfrey’s] of positing more and less in the case of a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, on account of which the form will be said to receive more and less; that disposition either is some form or it is not. If it is a form, and the subject is said to be more or less disposed according to it, the proposed conclusion follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b [Interpolation] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but it is some other form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, - and then one must ask about that disposition whether it is some form or not, and so there will either be a process to infinity in dispositions or a more and less in some form in itself must be granted. Again, there must first be a disposed subject before it may be moved to the term of the motion, because nothing is moved to anything save what is disposed to receiving that thing; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, the consequence is that something is acquired in the term of the motion other than the sole idea of disposition. - He says [sc. Godfrey] that more and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not dispositions of the same idea but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c [Interpolation] and therefore that more-ness is not in any single disposition.

d [Interpolation] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as they also have a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not the proper disposition, there can be more and less in individuals of the same species and so an intensity and a mildness in the form of that species without any such contrary or opposite dispositions preceding them in the subjects. Then the question is asked, as before, why something is more disposed now than it was before, as was argued [in interpolations a. and b. just above].

e [Interpolation ] if such opposed dispositions precede, to more and to less...

f [Interpolation] and so, in order for the intense degree to become mild, there must first be a movement from the disposition that is in the intense degree to a disposition agreeing with the mild degree before the mild degree may come to be from the intense degree, and conversely, - which is impossible, because then.

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.a

a [Interpolation] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence this does not follow, that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel has grace equally’.

247. Also a third way - which is held by some people - about ‘the rooting down of the form in the subject’ seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved,a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.

a [Interpolation] Again, this mode does not save the fact that one form is more intense than another.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede - especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] - that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if per impossibile all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if per impossibile it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.

III. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239].

To the first - about numbers [n.235] - I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. The Philosopher is there in fact comparing quiddities to numbers, to the extent they are definable, in the way Plato used to speak of quiddities, by positing them as separate [Scotus, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way, the quiddities of things, are indeed compared to numbers according to the four properties [ibid. nn.22-25] - one of which is this, that ‘anything added changes the species’; and I understand it thus, that the addition makes another species from the species, or that it makes a species from a non-species. For any difference, when added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the nature of a genus it determines it to the nature of a species, which is something that was not had before the addition of the difference.a

a [Interpolation] An example about the intellective soul, when it is added as the difference to the sensitive soul.

251. I say, then, that an addition to the quiddity, when the quiddity is taken according to the idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species]. But what is not added to a quiddity as it is a quiddity does not change the species; now any individual degree, just as also an individual difference that contracts a thing to being a ‘this’, whether it is an individual unity or an individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is added; for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor can it change it from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is of the idea of a species, - and no individual condition is of this sort.

252. Next, as to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of number were added to a preexisting number the species of the number would be changed; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or is a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were made more intense than before [e.g. made more white]), then the species would not in itself be changed.a So in the proposed case: any individual difference (or degree) that is added to a quiddity is not of the nature to be a part of the quiddity.

a [Interpolation] but in some individual degree.

253. By the same fact [n.252] the response is plain as regard Porphyry [n.237], that he likewise is speaking of difference insofar as it is a per se part of definition. Difference in this way consists in something indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which indifference - in its totality - is its degree as it is a specific difference; for thus it does not receive the more and less, because ‘all cases of more and less’ can belong to individuals in this way and these cases are all within this indifference of the difference and do not, in accord with this indifference, add anything to the difference.

254. To the passage from the Metaphysics 10 [n.236] the same response can be made, by calling formal difference ‘quidditative difference’.

255. One can also reply - as to the form - that not every difference of forms is a formal difference, speaking properly of formal difference, namely insofar as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference in men is a difference in the form of humanity. A reason in reality and in logic is assigned for this. In reality as follows: men can possess the form of humanity and be different, though not by humanity - and so they do not differ in humanity; thus pure forms can differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not be formally different, because to differ formally -properly speaking - is the same as to differ in form or according to form.a In logic as follows: because the term of a difference is understood through the negation that is included in the difference, therefore it can be taken confusedly or distributively with respect to that negation; so too, that which is denominated as being the idea of the difference (of which sort is what is construed along with the verb ‘differ’, as that in which or according to which the denomination is made) could be confounded by the negation. But, as it is, the negation of the superior does not follow on the negation of the inferior, but there is denial of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.Vatican editors: “by saying, ‘there is a difference or a non-identity between men, therefore there is a difference or a non-identity between them in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’; or, in other words, ‘this man differs from that man or is not that man, therefore they are different or not the same in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’. Tr. the denial of a logically inferior difference (e.g. an individual difference that distinguishes this man from that) is not followed by the denial of a logically superior difference (e.g. a specific difference that distinguishes this species, man, from that species, horse). Or, to put it in logical form: while the conditional statement ‘if they are the same individual then they are the same species’ is true, one commits the fallacy of the consequent if one argues from the denial of the antecedent (the denial of the inferior difference) to a denial of the consequent (the denial of a superior difference), as in ‘but they are not the same individual, therefore they are not the same species’. ⁵¹

a [Interpolation] I also say as to the reality that things can differ in species between themselves and yet not cause such a difference in a third thing, - just as white and black differ in species and yet white Socrates and black Plato do not differ in species; so although the individual differences are diverse primarily, yet they do not vary the essence, because they are accidents of the essence and material with respect to it, - and the same as to masculine and feminine, and also as to degrees with respect to the form in itself, which form does not, according to its existence, determine for itself a determinate degree.

256. To the other authority from the Six Principles [n.238]: its conclusion is to be conceded in the way it proves the simplicity of the form. But it proves a simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when a form is added it does not make a greater in bulk (for a form when placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let a simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded - but this is nothing against an intensity in amount, which is what pertains to the proposed case.

257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to the remark ‘something that is accidental to the nature of the species’, it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus - and in this way an accident is taken in the fallacy of accident for something extraneous that is outside the idea of another thing; in another way an accident is said to be what does not make a ‘per se unity’ together with that of which it is an accident, as white together with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which is accidental to the nature of the species (so also does a mild whiteness, nay any individual has something that is accidental to the nature of the species -otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted to individuals); in the second way I say that an intense whiteness does not have something that is accidental to the nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in itself makes a ‘per se unity’ with the nature, just as any individual difference added to the nature makes a ‘per se unity’ with the nature. When therefore you say ‘if the intense thing includes something which is accidental to the nature of the species, then the mild thing, which does not include it, is not in the species’ [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, but the antecedent is true in this first way -and not in the other way.a

a [Interpolation] So the inference ‘therefore such a degree is not in the species’ is not valid, but the inference should be ‘therefore such a degree is not the species’; so it exists in the species as contained under it. Nor does this inference follow, ‘therefore the other degree will not be in the species’; for this does not follow, ‘it does not have whatever pertains to the species, therefore it is not in the species’. - Or one can say that ‘something pertains to the species’ is taken in two ways, either as to quiddity or as to subject. Quidditative parts belong per se to the understanding of the species, though not to the understanding of the subject but are as it were remote parts of it; so things are in the proposed case: no formal degree belongs to the species as a part per se and essential to the species (because the species can be understood without any degree), but it does very well pertain to the species as being contained under the species.

[N.B. A large blank space was left here by Scotus, both for a further question within distinction 17 and for distinction 18, but neither the further question nor the further distinction are contained in the text of the Ordinatio. They have to be supplied from the Reportatio or the Additiones Magnae.]